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Highlights 
 Full compensation leads to lax preventative behaviour 
 Less than full compensation  may encourage positive behaviours but needs to be conditional  
 A range of regulatory, fiscal and nudging policies required to achieve optimal positive 
behaviour  
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Abstract 
With an increasing burden on public sector budgets, increased responsibility and cost sharing 
mechanisms for animal diseases are being considered. To achieve this, fiscal and non-fiscal 
intervention policies need to be designed such that they consistently promote positive disease 
risk management practices by animal keepers. This paper presents a review of the available 
evidence towards whether and how the level and type of funding mechanism affects change 
within biosecurity behaviours and the frequency of disease reporting. A Nuffield Health 
Ladder of Interventions approach is proposed as a way to frame the debate surrounding both 
current compensation mechanisms and how it is expected to change behaviour. Results of the 
review reveal a division between economic modelling approaches, which implicitly assume a 
causal link between payments and positive behaviours, and socio-geographic approaches 
which tend to ignore the influence of compensation mechanisms on influencing behaviours. 
Generally, economic studies suggest less than full compensation rates will encourage positive 
behaviours, but the non-economic literature indicate significant variation in response to 
compensation reflecting heterogeneity of livestock keepers  in terms of their values, goals, 
risk attitudes, size of operation, animal species and production chain characteristics. This may 
be of encouragement to Western Governments seeking to shift cost burdens as it may induce 
greater targeting of non-fiscal mechanisms, or suggest more novel ways to augment current 
compensation mechanisms to both increase responsibility sharing and reduce this cost 
burden. This review suggests that a range of regulatory, fiscal and nudging policies are 
required to achieve socially optimal results with respect to positive behaviour change.  
However, the lack of directly available evidence which proves these causal links may hinder 
progress towards this optimal mixture of choice and non-choice based interventions. 
Keywords: compensation; behaviours; exotic diseases; biosecurity; Nuffield ladder. 
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1. Introduction 
A series of high profile epidemics of exotic animal diseases including bluetongue, classical 
swine fever (CSF) and foot and mouth disease (FMD) have called into question current 
systems of animal disease prevention and control in Western Europe. The benefits of 
avoiding or better controlling such outbreaks are obvious and could offer substantial returns. 
Several enquiries (e.g. Anderson, 2002, Royal Society, 2002; Bourn, 2002) and related 
academic reviews (e.g. Donaldson et al., 2002; Taylor, 2003; Murphy-Lawless, 2004; 
Campbell and Lee 2003) have examined the experiences in detail in an effort to identify 
better ways to manage animal health. One of the key findings of these works has been that 
policies of compensation for both animal and production losses due to infectious diseases 
need to be re-designed in a way that consistently promotes positive disease risk management 
practices, such as early reporting and notification of suspicious cases of contagious disease by 
animal keepers. This will provide the best return on investment for stakeholders. In addition, 
early detection, diagnosis and notification of disease are considered by the World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) as critical to minimise the consequences of outbreaks 
(World Organization for Animal Health, 2010, 2015). To tackle the significant problem of 
financing of costs and losses of epidemic livestock diseases, formation of a global emergency 
response fund for animal epizootics (GERFAE) has been suggested that will, among its other 
functions, “encourage an effective and rapid emergency response for control of epidemic 
livestock diseases in developing and transition countries, including through compensation of 
livestock holders” (Alleweldt et al., 2007, p.9).  
Design considerations of compensation policies for such an outcome should include 
aspects of information asymmetry, that is when one party has more or superior information 
compared to another during a transaction, and incentive compatibility, namely when the 
incentives that motivate the actions of individual participants are consistent with following 
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the ‘rules’ established by the group.  In addition, the design of mechanisms needs to consider 
whether responsiveness varies with both the nature and source of compensation, as well as 
other influences on animal keeper behaviour (Gramig and Wolf, 2005; Jin and McCarl, 2006; 
Koontz et al., 2006; Pannell and Vanclay, 2011; Oparinde and Birol, 2012; Hennessy, 2013; 
Hennessy and Wolf, 2015). 
Positive behavioural change is a common term within Government policy agendas 
and relates to modifying a target group’s actions to achieve an outcome or set of outcomes 
which are socially desirable. In this case, positive disease risk management alludes to the 
effect of compensation payment to livestock keepers in changing their biosecurity behaviours 
and/or disease reporting in order to, ultimately, reduce the total disease cost and incidence. 
Within a new institutional economics approach, if the behaviours have been adequately 
identified then farmers could be ‘nudged’ towards a positive behavioural outcome, or, in 
some cases, expect elements of stricter regulation to restrict negative behaviours (e.g. Barnes 
et al., 2013).  
A useful schematic of the choices available to Government agencies is the Nuffield 
Health Ladder of Interventions (NCB, 2007). This shows a series of interventions mapped 
against the imposition of available choices for the target population. This approach facilitates 
the identification of possible interventions which encourage positive behaviours through 
fiscal (e.g. financial compensation or penalties) and non-fiscal processes, (e.g. group sharing 
of information or increasing pressure through social norms to report a suspicious incident). 
An example of such a ladder applied to positive behaviours is shown in Fig. 1.  
This figure shows a range of interventions which could be used to encourage positive 
behaviours. These are ranked in terms of increasing levels of choice for the livestock keeper. 
Regulatory approaches and incentive-based systems tend to impose more control on the 
livestock system compared to the other interventions and hence, within a neo-liberal agenda 
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such as in the UK, there is a desire to shift this responsibility and cost burden through more 
voluntary approaches, to encourage co-operation both across livestock keepers, but also 
within a supply chain to manage animal health or, more commonly, by providing and 
targeting information on biosecurity and awareness of  exotic disease for reporting. The main 
focus of this review is on fiscal or incentive-based interventions, namely compensation and 
penalties.  Nevertheless, the possibility of using a mixture of fiscal and less fiscal incentives 
that promotes greater positive disease risk management practices by animal keepers is also 
discussed. 
What follows is a review of literature which has examined the consequences of these 
various interventions on encouraging or, indeed, discouraging these desirable positive 
behaviours. This is established against the landscape of highly contagious exotic diseases, 
which has been explored by a number of authors (Ekboir, 1999; Sumner et al., 2005; Otte et 
al., 2004).   
In re-designing compensation schemes, governments and other stakeholders need to 
reframe incentives to change behaviour in a way that reduces overall risk and scale of exotic 
diseases. Evidence and lessons from the literature on the impact of exotic disease 
compensation policies on animal keeper behaviours’ and the likely effectiveness of different 
compensation measures for promoting positive disease risk management practices, are 
therefore essential. A series of seven questions (Table 1) that were deemed to be the most 
important to underpin the redesign of compensation policies were posed by the research 
sponsor (Defra), who required a quick (two-month) turn-around on the project and hence 
commissioned a Rapid Evidence Assessment (Petticrew and Roberts 2006) rather than a more 
extended study.   
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether these questions have been 
answered in the literature and, in so doing, identify possible knowledge and research gaps. 
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Accordingly, the main objective of this review is to investigate the relationship between 
exotic disease compensation policies and observed positive behaviours in terms of reporting 
and implementing biosecurity when outbreaks occur and in “peacetime”. In parallel, the 
effects of possible other factors that induce positive behaviours were also investigated.    
The fragmented nature of the literature, across several domains such as agricultural 
economics, sociology, human behaviour as well as veterinary epidemiology, may constrain a 
search of relevant literature. However, prevailing literatures in behavioural theory as well as 
that existing in the animal health economics sphere (covering farmers’ individual and social 
behaviours, socioeconomic and epidemiological studies) were the main domains of these 
studies. Overall this approach enabled us to assess the level of evidence around exotic disease 
compensation and positive behavioural response. The primary questions were defined as: a) 
to identify the relationship between exotic disease compensation and positive behaviours with 
respect to biosecurity measures; and b) other factors that most influence how quickly animal 
keepers report exotic disease and carry out essential biosecurity measures. 
The next section outlines the methodology used and the application to the framework.  
This is then followed by results which firstly examine the economic investigations, as the role 
of compensation in shaping incentive structures is clearly driven primarily by economic 
insights. This is then followed by ‘non-economic’ investigations to provide a broader 
perspective to fully implement these mechanisms in a heterogeneous population such as 
farmers and hobby livestock keeping. Gaps are identified and then a list of recommended 
topics to address the identified gaps are presented and discussed.  
 
2. Methodology 
An adapted Population, Intervention, Comparator, Outcome (PICO) approach was used to 
design search strings for use in web search engines and databases of academic literature. In 
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addition, to further understand the policy dialogue and regional impact of compensation on 
positive biosecurity behaviour 10 international experts and academics who have conducted 
research and reviewers of animal health related compensation mechanisms were contacted 
based on their contribution to the literature and also through suggestions from policy 
colleagues. This enabled us to seek further (grey) literature on compensation in these 
countries including Germany, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Spain and Australia. 
The PICO process which is a widely used method in conducting systematic literature 
reviews was adopted to develop a literature search strategy (Miller et al., 2013; Houghton-
Carr, et. al., 2013; Petticrew and Roberts, 2006). Particularly the PICO process was used to 
break down the mentioned research questions into components (Table 2) that best represent 
the initial scope of the work and to aid further analysis of the available evidence. A selection 
of databases namely: Web of Knowledge, Web of Science, Scopus and Google Scholar were 
used to optimise the coverage of the research. The search was restricted to papers published 
in English. The titles, keywords and abstracts of the published articles were gathered using 
search strings developed within the team and by a set of policy experts within Defra.  The 
search strings presented in Table 3 were used and were combined using the Boolean OR 
operator and the Boolean AND operator. 
The search of Web of Science generated 224 hits of which 49 were judged worth 
looking at in more detail once titles and abstracts had been reviewed.  Papers were included if 
they were judged to address ‘compensation/incentives/behavioural’ issues for disease control 
and were excluded if they did not relate to disease control or to livestock disease. A small 
number of papers on (e.g.) crops or aquatics were retained as they could be of related interest 
to the questions.  The same search on Google Scholar generated a further 50 hits (only the 
first 10 pages were reviewed), of which 12 were not present in the Web of Science results. Of 
these, 10 were deemed worthy of further consideration. A simpler search on AgEconSearch 
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(AgEconSearch, 2015) because the full search string was too complex for that database (so a 
simpler “livestock disease compensation" string was used) yielded two additional papers. 
Closer inspection of the combined 61 papers eliminated five, leaving 56 as relevant.  
However, using Google Scholar to see where these 56 had been cited and looking at each 
paper's list of references generated a further 42 relevant papers. Also, two additional papers 
were suggested by academics that the research team contacted.   
The search on Science Direct generated 853 papers of which 190 were judged worth 
looking at in  more detail once titles and abstracts had been reviewed. From these, 38 papers 
not already identified above were judged applicable to the questions outlined in Table 1.  In 
addition, published papers in the past four years (2011-2014) in the journal of Preventive 
Veterinary Medicine were reviewed and a further five relevant papers not captured by the 
search term were identified. Also, a review of the reference lists of the three most relevant 
papers (i.e. Elbers et al., 2010a; Delgado et al., 2014; Toma et al., 2013) found that all the 
relevant papers in those reference lists were already included in our previous searches, 
offering some reassurance on search coverage despite its necessary haste.  
The above mentioned search process generated a total number of 141 papers. This 
initial list was then refined by applying exclusion criteria based on the research scope and 
domains depicted in the PICO process. In total 95 articles which met all the exclusion and 
inclusion criteria were reviewed at full text. One area which was particularly 
underrepresented is in relation to “bonuses and penalties” in disease compensation (question 
4 in Table 1).  To accommodate this aspect a limited additional search was used to identify 
potentially relevant example articles from other areas such as human health interventions, 
employment contracts and regulatory design.  Two sources namely Web of Science, last five 
years (i.e. 2010-2015) only, and Google Scholar, first two pages only were used for this 
purpose. This added a further 12 articles.  
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The full texts of the selected 107 papers were critically reviewed against the seven 
questions defined in Table 1 to assess whether these have been answered in the literature and 
also to identify important gaps in knowledge that require further research. In order to do this, 
papers were categorised based on the described seven research questions and the main 
findings of each paper were extracted in summary form. In addition a three-point qualitative 
score, based on the reviewer’s judgement, was allocated to each paper in terms of relevance 
to the question, as well as country applied, livestock sector and specific disease(s) 
investigated. Results of the full text review of the selected 107 papers are presented in the 
next section.  
 
3. Results 
This section is organised as follows, i)  background into the approaches and theories on 
public intervention tackling exotic livestock disease using economic and behavioural 
literature,  ii) findings that address each of the seven research questions outlined in Table 1, 
and iii) the lessons of relevance to the compensation review and identified gaps that need to 
be examined by future research. 
 
3.1 Public intervention into exotic livestock disease: economic literature 
Economic analysis of livestock disease generally focuses on how individual farmers respond 
to disease risks and outbreaks, emphasising how decisions vary across different 
circumstances, states of nature and incentive structures. This approach highlights linkages 
between disease epidemiology and farmers’ behaviour, stressing the need to account for 
dynamic endogeneity (i.e. allowing for feedback loops between choices made and the 
circumstances then faced) and choice architecture (i.e. the design of different ways in which 
choices can be presented, and the impact of the design on decision-making) rather than 
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assuming only static relationships or external influences. Although heterogeneity of farms 
and the effects of both individuals’ behaviour and institutions and their circumstances are 
addressed by various social science disciplines (e.g. psychological or cultural perspectives), 
economic research frames disease problems and behaviour in simpler and more stylised 
terms. Moreover, economic insights typically emerge from theoretical or simulation 
modelling based on a number of simplifying assumptions rather than empirical data. 
Consequently there is a general lack of comparative evaluations of actual rather than 
modelled outcomes under different policies. For example, Jin and McCarl (2006), Beach et 
al. (2007), Hennessy (2007), Gramig et al. (2009), Boni et al. (2013) and Hennessy and Wang 
(2013) all present algebraic models of behaviour under different compensation arrangements, 
but with little recourse to empirics.  
Where empirical data are used, the applications tend to be restricted to simulations 
rather than comparisons of actual observed differences. For example,  Bicknell et al. (1999) 
and Gramig and Horan (2011) both use numerical simulations to explore  bovine 
Tuberculosis (bTB) controls in New Zealand whilst Elbakidze (2008) simulate avian flu in 
the USA and Reeling and Horan (2015) simulate alternative compensation arrangements for 
FMD during the UK outbreak in 2001.  The lack of comparative empirical data is 
acknowledged by economists (e.g. Rich and Perry, 2011), but as yet few attempts have been 
made to purposively collect or utilise such information.  
Notable exceptions include Kuchler and Hamm (2000) who were able to use observed 
variation in compensation payments and reporting of scrapie in the USA to show that higher 
compensation payments are associated with higher rates of reporting, and Ifft et al. (2011) 
who use household data for small poultry producers in Vietnam to show that disease 
management cannot be separated from other production decisions. Oparinde and Birol (2012) 
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take a different approach and use choice experiments to test Nigerian farmers’ preferences for 
different compensation approaches.  
Nevertheless, the absence of comparative empirical evidence has not prevented 
economics from clearly influencing policy thinking and contributing to promotion of cost and 
responsibility sharing (Sanco, 2006; McKenzie et al., 2006; OECD, 2012; OECD, 2013).  
This partly reflects a desire to ease pressure on public budgets, but also reflects economic 
insights into interactions across farms and between private and public efforts to combat 
diseases. In particular, there is potential for public funding to dampen private efforts and 
reduce overall effectiveness, meaning that payment rates and conditionality (i.e. eligibility 
criteria) for public funding need to be set with regard to their effect on the incentives facing 
farmers. For example full (100%) compensation for culled animals is shown by economic 
models to lead to less on-farm effort to prevent disease (in essence ‘why bother if outbreak 
costs are covered?’) and thus higher probability of contracting diseases and consequently 
production losses than if partial compensation is available (Gramig et al., 2009). Hence, in 
essence, this means that sharing of risks alters farmers’ behaviour. This is despite the fact that 
empirical support cited for incentive effects often take the form of poorly described case 
studies or anecdotal observations (e.g. McKenzie et al., 2006) which makes formal 
comparative evaluations of different arrangements very difficult  (Sanco, 2006; OECD, 
2012).  
However, although the insights offered by economic analysis may be influencing 
policy thinking, they take the form of general guidance rather than detailed prescriptions for 
specific cases – indeed variation across different diseases and different farming structures 
(e.g. farm type and size, production method) is anticipated. Published compensation guidance 
(e.g. McKenzie et al., 2006; USDA, undated) thus appears to reflect a mix of economic 
principles and “rules of thumb” drawn from observed policy arrangements across different 
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countries.  For example, pegging compensation at 70% to 90% (McKenzie et al., 2006) and 
making payment of partial compensation conditional (or indeed offering subsidies) on 
adherence to certain management practices to also encourage greater biosecurity (although 
this imposes additional monitoring costs on government).  
Similarly, the same economic models and published guidance suggest that the timely 
notification of diseased animals can be encouraged by making payment of compensation 
conditional on early reporting, typically gauged by the prevalence of diseased or dead 
animals on the farm at the time of reporting (i.e. higher payment is offered if only a few 
animals are diseased or dead).  Where policies have seemingly been adjusted for cost and 
responsibility sharing (e.g. Australia, Netherlands) it is not clear the extent to which variation 
in compensation arrangements across different diseases and/or different farmers is grounded 
in detailed empirical evidence rather than simply heuristics (rules-of-thumb) and stakeholder 
negotiation (Sanco, 2006; OECD, 2012).  
 
3.2 Public intervention into exotic livestock disease: behavioural and sociological 
literatures 
Whilst the economics literature focuses very clearly upon the relative effect of alternative 
compensation effects, the behavioural and sociological literatures rarely consider financial 
incentives at all.  Two exceptions are Ellis-Iversen et al. (2010), for cattle farmers in England 
and Wales, and Lupo et al. (2014), for oyster farmers in France. More generally, the 
behavioural literature identifies a range of non-financial influences on adoption of biosecurity 
measures and disease reporting. These interventions are considered as nudges or choice-
architecture in the Nuffield intervention ladder.  For example, farmers’ awareness/knowledge 
of diseases, feelings of guilt or shame, belief in the efficacy of control measures, and trust in 
neighbours/advisory services/government bodies are repeatedly reported as important (e.g. 
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Elbers et al., 2010a; Delgado et al., 2012; Brennan and Christley, 2013; Garforth et al., 2013).  
Yet such factors are not considered in the economics literature, revealing a significant 
research and policy gap. Effectively this gap suggests that compensation may be important, 
but its interactions with other factors are clearly under-researched in relation to both endemic 
and exotic animal diseases. The more sociological literature offers a slightly different 
perspective, again highlighting issues of awareness and trust (e.g. Palmer, 2009; Vanclay and 
Enticott, 2011), but also emphasising how  looking at behaviours without considering context 
can be misleading since behaviours and policy structures evolve jointly and neither are 
geographically uniform (e.g. Enticott, 2008;  Hinchcliffe and Ward, 2014; Maye  et al., 
2014).  Ironically, albeit using different terminology, the theoretical economics literature 
acknowledges the need to consider behavioural differences (e.g. across farm types and sizes) 
and dynamic feedback between behaviour and policy decisions (e.g. Rich and Perry, 2011), 
but largely fails to explore such issues empirically, again this reveals a research gap.    
If such a behavioural change, by means of redesigning compensation mechanism, is to 
succeed, it is crucially important to know what drives key behaviours of animal keepers, 
whether the policy options available are likely to be more effective, and whether the financial 
source of the compensation (e.g. Government, industry or levy board, etc.) makes a 
difference to animal keepers’ behaviour. It is known that drivers of behaviours, their 
effectiveness and importance vary by sector, disease and the circumstances.  
 
3.3 Finding in relation to specific research questions 
3.3.1 Factors affecting speed of reporting diseases 
These factors can be summarised as (a) financial recompense; (b) getting full market value; 
and (c) pay-out received for diseased or dead animals.  The economics literature assumes 
profit maximising behaviour by commercial farmers, adjusted in some cases for risk-
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averseness but with incentives couched purely in financial terms. Algebraically and/or 
through simulation modelling, it can be shown that farmers can be incentivised to look for 
and then report disease (e.g. Jin and McCarl, 2006; Hennessy, 2007; Gramig et al., 2009). 
Specifically, higher payment rates encourage reporting (Kuchler and Hamm, 2000) whilst the 
threat of reducing payment rates (or imposing actual penalties) for late reporting can 
encourage earlier notification.  For ease of monitoring, the number of already dead or sick 
animals on a farm at the time of reporting is usually taken as a proxy indicator of how quickly 
a disease was identified and reported (McKenzie et al., 2006; OECD, 2012). Stylised 
economic modelling of non-profit-maximising hobby farmers suggests that they may respond 
differently than commercial livestock keepers (Ceddia et al., 2008; Kobayashi and 
Melkonyan, 2011).   
One paper (Lupo et al., 2014) specifically pertains to exotic disease, reporting, and 
behaviour in respect to operations and compensation. These authors designed and conducted 
a retrospective case-control study of oyster farmers, based on interviews with 27 non-
reporting and 89 reporting farmers in France. Information about farmer and farm 
characteristics, farming practices, farm health history and related financial compensation on 
the farm, knowledge of the mortality reporting system and reporting behaviour was collected. 
They used an ordinal logistic regression to model farmers’ reporting behaviour. Though 
centred on oyster farming, it usefully draws upon other studies across animal types 
internationally. Moreover, it highlights motivational aspects of compensation while 
separating these from other (broadly behavioural) considerations.  In particular, compensation 
for production losses was observed to be a clear incentive for reporting, but in this context 
was countered by two main factors: what the authors refer to as a ‘habituation effect,’ and a 
lack of awareness of the aims of the reporting scheme. In this case, habituation referred to an 
interesting combination of lack of continuing alertness and awareness (i.e. complacency) and 
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also of the level of (continuing) involvement by the authorities that led to an exotic disease, 
through uncontrolled spread, in fact becoming endemic. The authors also observed that 
producers pursued self-interest rather than an interest geared to a contribution towards the 
early detection of disease outbreak. 
Habituation can apply to other scenarios whereby producers simply become 
accustomed to a situation that has previously been stressed as important, and this may lead to 
a decreased level of (motivated) vigilance. Similarly, through less or decreasing emphasis on 
partnership and investment in the larger aims and societal benefits of the work, intrinsic 
motivational processes will be affected.  This also implies the need for persuasion and regular 
baseline communications between agencies and producers to establish and maintain a certain 
quality of relationship.     
Elbers et al. (2010a and 2010b) used a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
research design to investigate farmers’ behaviours with respect to reporting or not reporting 
clinically suspect situations. For the qualitative part focus group sessions with farmers and 
other stakeholders as well as personal in-depth interviews with pig farmers and veterinary 
practitioners were held. The quantitative part was based on an electronic questionnaire survey 
of the members of a large pig farmer organisation. A grounded theory approach was used to 
analyse the content of focus group and in-depth interviews and statistical methods were used 
to analyse the questionnaires. These authors identified six key themes when reporting 
clinically suspect situations in relation to classic swine fever and avian flu in the Netherlands. 
These were a lack of knowledge of the early signs; guilt, shame and prejudice; negative 
opinion of control measures; dissatisfaction with post-reporting procedures; a lack of trust in 
government bodies; and uncertainty and lack of transparency of reporting procedures. The 
Dutch system of compensation where healthy animals are fully compensated, sick animals 
are compensated for 50% and dead animals are not compensated was discussed with a small 
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group of farmers.  The authors identified that the financial ‘reward’ for notifying contagious 
animal disease as quickly as possible is that the compensation for further consequences, in 
case there is indeed an outbreak, may be higher. 
Furthermore, a small sample of pig farmers was surveyed for this study (76 in total).  
When asked ‘is the difference in compensation between sick and dead animals a good 
stimulus to report’, 56% of farmers surveyed agreed with this statement.  Conversely 45% of 
the respondents agreed that ‘The threat of possibly paying a penalty for negligence is 
perceived as an important reason to report a suspicious clinical situation’. This perhaps 
identifies the heterogeneity of livestock keepers and their perceptions towards the influence 
of compensation on their reporting behaviour.   
 
3.3.2 Relationship between compensation and biosecurity in peacetime vs outbreak 
One of the main messages of the economics modelling literature is that public funding can 
displace private efforts (e.g. Gramig et al. (2009), who developed a principal-agent model). In 
particular, full compensation for animals culled as a result of an outbreak (plus funding of 
clean-up activities) means that farmers may be disinclined to implement (costly) biosecurity 
since most of the direct costs of an outbreak will fall on others.  Hence compensation should 
be less than 100% to ensure farmers have a stronger financial interest in preventing an 
outbreak. Behaviour during an outbreak may be different (Delgado et al., 2014), and direct 
subsidisation of peacetime biosecurity may be merited instead (i.e. compensation payments 
are being asked to achieve too many things). 
Firestone et al. (2014) studied horse owners/managers behaviour and perception in 
relation to equine influenza using a Bayesian network model on data from interviews 
conducted during a retrospective case-control study of the 2007 outbreak of equine influenza 
in Australia. These authors noted that past outbreak experience influenced the perception of 
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biosecurity, i.e. positive experience of control measures and procedures during outbreak 
engendered trust and more favourable perception of preventative actions and their 
effectiveness in peace time.  While there are no specific studies on exotic disease 
compensation and implementation of biosecurity measures there is some evidence of changes 
in perceptions in relation to biosecurity in peacetime vs outbreak.   
Delgado et al. (2014) surveyed Texan livestock keepers using two questionnaires to 
determine beliefs of farmers about reporting cattle with clinical signs consistent with foot-
and-mouth disease (FMD) both prior to and during an outbreak of FMD disease. They 
analysed the results by using a combination of scenario analysis, Likert-like scale and ordinal 
logistic regression. Respondents agreed that reporting clinically suspect cases would have 
positive economic and emotional consequences during peacetime. However, during an 
outbreak, producers were less likely to agree with these positive outcomes. Accordingly, this 
seems to indicate that perceptions at least change during an outbreak and this may have an 
effect on reporting outbreaks if the economic consequences are seen as less positive for the 
livestock keeper. Writing on the effects of regulatory unrests to disease spread through cattle 
movements in the UK, based on the results of a stochastic fully individual-based model, 
Vernon and Keeling (2012) discuss post-policy behaviours on the part of livestock keepers, 
distinguishing between outbreak and peacetime situations.  
Overall, this work highlights that policy alterations have been generally after-the-fact 
propositions, implying further reasons for prevention and pre-emption of disease outbreaks 
(and their social welfare and economic costs). But it also adds to the literature that all 
behaviours of individuals, agencies, and systems are dynamic and reactive, and that this 
dynamism has recursive effects.  The results of their modelling simulations suggest the cattle 
industry is prone to undergo boom-bust dynamics and the behaviour of producers in 
epidemic-free times (in peacetime, aimed at maximising profits) may heighten the probability 
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for large-scale epidemics. No doubt, the experience of past after-the-fact policy (and market 
turbulence) events and tendencies will contribute to this stakeholder behaviour.   
 
3.3.3 Most influencing factors affecting behaviour  
There is limited evidence concerning the above questions which are directly relevant to 
compensation. The economics literature focuses exclusively on financial incentives, implying 
that biosecurity and reporting behaviour is driven purely by how financial outcomes are 
affected by disease characteristics, market forces and policy signals.  Conversely, behavioural 
and social science based literature emphasise other influences on behaviour, predominantly 
trust in the methods and institutions for policing exotic disease. For example Garforth et al. 
(2013); explored attitudes and responses of nine sheep and six pig farmers in England to the 
proposed animal health practices, and factors influencing the likelihood of implementation. 
Focussing on the management of bTB and drawing on interviews with 65 cattle farmers, 
Maye et al. (2014) examined neoliberal styles of animal disease governance and farmers' 
understandings of disease, nature and wildlife.  
Some studies using behavioural economic approaches have attempted to measure the 
influence of financial and non-financial factors on determining uptake of biosecurity 
practices.  For instance by using a structural equation modelling applied to a dataset collected 
through a stratified telephone survey, Toma et al. (2013) found ‘economic factors’ to be 
significantly related to livestock biosecurity for a sample of 900 beef and sheep farmers in 
Great Britain.  However this had less of an effect than having positive ‘biosecurity attitudes’.  
Higher levels of knowledge about biosecurity measures ranked as having the strongest 
influence. However, given the different contexts, time frames and non-specificity to 
compensation as a financial variable within these studies we cannot draw any robust 
conclusions from this literature.   
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Schembri et al. (2014) applied univariate and multivariable logistic regression models 
to a dataset collected from 104 detailed interviews with pig farmers in the three eastern states 
of Australia to examined biosecurity practices of small-scale and peri-urban pig producers. 
These authors found that biosecurity perceptions to be influenced by the nature and scale of 
the operation, with small scale producers not reliant on livestock for household income 
having a lower level of perception towards the importance of biosecurity.  The behaviour, or 
perceived behaviour, of neighbours is referred to in a number of papers as an influencing 
factor in biosecurity behaviour on farm (Murray, 2014; Rosanowski, et al., 2013; Schemann 
et al., 2012). Trust in veterinarians (particularly pre-outbreak) is also identified as being 
important in these studies. Veterinarians are considered a key source of knowledge and 
advice on biosecurity regardless of livestock, disease and country. Accordingly, they should 
be deployed as a means of  instilling trust within the population and, perhaps, they can 
increase responsibility of livestock keepers for prevention and control of diseases particularly 
during an outbreak.   
 
3.3.4 Bonus or Penalty is likely to be more effective 
Distinctions between the use of bonuses and penalties, such as rewarding early disease 
reporting and fining late reporting, are seemingly not considered explicitly in much of the 
specialist literature on livestock disease. This applies to both the behavioural literature, where 
financial incentives are rarely considered at all, and to the economics literature, where 
references to rewards and threats are mentioned (e.g. Gramig et al., 2009) but not in great 
detail. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) distinguishes between gains or losses 
and people are expected to behave differently under the prospect of either of these outcomes.  
This leads to the concept of ‘loss aversion’, which suggests that people are more sensitive to 
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a loss compared to an equivalent gain and their behaviour is moderated through this risk 
perception framework.  
Bocqueho et al., (2014) tested this theory with a behavioural economic experiment on 
a diverse mixture of farmers within rural regions of Eastern France. The results of the 
experiment suggest that farmers respond more to penalties than to bonuses due to this ‘loss 
aversion’ effect. The idea that farmers fear a loss more than they value a gain can be equated 
to the mechanism of animal health compensation. That is, if prospect theory holds, farmers 
should respond to penalties more than offered bonuses for early reporting behaviours.  
However, the marginal effect of these two outcomes has yet to be tested within the domain of 
animal disease compensation.   
Loss aversion and the effect of framing contracts in terms of rewards or penalties are 
considered more fully in extensive literatures beyond livestock disease. For example, 
economists have explored how best to structure employment contracts and public 
procurement arrangements to improve performance (e.g. Lewis, 1980; Christ et al., 2012; 
Brink and Rankin, 2013; Bigoni et al., 2014). Equally, the use of financial incentives for 
human health interventions has also received attention (e.g. Kane et al., 2004; Adams et al., 
2014; Wanders et al., 2014). As with the disease literature, there is a mix of mathematical 
modelling and (small-scale) empirical data, but the policy implications are ambiguous with 
several papers highlighting how the relative effect of bonuses or penalties is affected by other 
factors. For example, Christ et al. (2012), suggest that situational complexity can exert a 
greater influence than loss aversion and Adams et al. (2014) helpfully present systematic 
review results’ suggesting a range of incentive attributes beyond simply a distinction between 
a positive bonus and a negative penalty. 
 
3.3.5 Effect of source of fund on biosecurity behaviours 
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Although the source of funding may differ between private or mutual insurance and public 
agencies (Assefa et al., 2012),  the more abstract economic literature generally treats the basis 
of the funding as more important than the source per se. That is, insurance funding is 
typically based on a more detailed risk assessment that differentiates between different 
diseases and circumstances whereas public funding is typically undifferentiated. The 
availability of insurance may be a constraint (Koontz et al., 2006).  However, the feasibility 
of insurance funding and farmers’ preferences for different types of levies are explored 
(Meuwissen et al., 2003; Niemi and Heikkila, 2011; Niemi et al., 2014). 
There is no specific evidence relating to the source of funding.  Many of the studies 
reviewed discussed the importance of trust in responsible bodies in relation to farmers’ 
perceptions of biosecurity and their behaviour. Trust in agencies may be related to past 
experiences during outbreaks, or in relation with agencies with respect to other matters 
(Kristensen and Jakobson, 2011; Palmer et al., 2009; Maye et al., 2014). 
 
3.3.6 Perverse incentives 
In addition to the potential ‘crowding-out’, or reducing the incentive for private effort by 
public funding (e.g. Hennessy and Wong, 2013), perverse incentives can arise if payments to 
diseased farms leave them in a better financial position than non-diseased farms that are 
nonetheless subject to movement restrictions and incur uncompensated costs.  In such cases, 
there is an incentive for these farms to seek infection, and/or to under-invest in pre-outbreak 
biosecurity. Equally, less than full compensation for diseased animals can incentivise keepers 
to attempt to sell animals on rather than report the infection (Koontz et al., 2006).  However, 
although economic models suggest these effects, empirical evidence for them is scarce, 
although anecdotal case studies are alluded to (e.g. McKenzie et al., 2006). 
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There is no specific evidence reported in the literature relating to policy and perverse 
incentives surrounding biosecurity, exotic disease reporting or compensation. Nevertheless, 
there is a wide body of literature on agri-environmental schemes, and therefore outside the 
domain of this review, which refers to the ‘perverse’ nature of subsidy schemes on affecting 
farmer behaviour.  However, it is debatable whether the generation of ecological goods and 
the protection of transmittable disease can be considered comparable. 
 
3.3.7 Impact of different compensation arrangements on disease reporting 
Much of the economic evidence takes the form of theoretical and/or simulation modelling, 
which suggests that different compensation arrangements do affect both rates and speeds of 
reporting (e.g. Jin and McCarl, 2006; Hennessy, 2007; Gramig et al., 2009). This is supported 
to a limited extent by some empirical applications (e.g. McKenzie et al., 2006), but these are 
relatively few in number and seldom have a counterfactual baseline against which to judge a 
particular arrangement (cf. Kuchler and Hamm, 2000). The influence of other factors on 
reporting is not considered in the economic literature.  
In response to our query to experts concerning the impact of different compensation 
policies, they suggested that the evidence base for compensation arrangements in livestock 
disease control policies was fragmented and incomplete. In particular, their opinions were 
that different disciplines were not well integrated and evaluations of policy were hindered by 
a lack of observed (as opposed to modelled) responses to different compensation rates and 
eligibility criteria”.     
 
4 Discussion  
There are significant evidence gaps in relation to farmers’ perceptions and behaviours with 
respect to compensation.  The majority of work in this area relates to overall perceptions and 
24 
 
behaviour towards biosecurity rather than the effect of compensation per se.  Hence, literature 
from non-economic domains has provided little or no insight into different compensation 
arrangements. 
A number of issues emerge from this study which highlight research gaps and areas 
which need to be addressed. A range of economics publications were identified that focused 
on incentive effects for biosecurity and disease reporting. A handful of authors dominate the 
field, but we identified others offering essentially the same insights based on theoretical 
and/or simulation models. The basic messages from the economic literature are that full 
compensation leads to lax preventative behaviour, so partial compensation may induce better 
biosecurity but that partial compensation needs to be conditional to encourage disease 
reporting.  
However, although casual empirics are offered in some cases, such messages are 
generally derived from stylised modelling exercises rather than empirical data. This means 
the appropriateness of specific arrangements to particular diseases or farm circumstances is 
not covered.  For example, if (as suggested by the non-economics literature) adherence to 
biosecurity measures is partly determined by belief in their efficacy which is in turn partly 
determined by trust in information sources, as well as neighbouring farmers and government, 
the effect of compensation arrangements is unlikely to be as straightforward as economic 
modelling suggests.   
The plethora of attitudinal studies confirms a range of other influences on behaviour 
(although the focus of these is mainly on biosecurity rather than reporting).  The results show 
that the role of compensation for exotic animal disease does not appear to have been 
considered explicitly in parallel literatures drawing on psychology (e.g. Theory of Planned 
Behaviour) or broader social-science (e.g. cultural scripts) perspectives of farmer behaviour. 
In only a few cases is compensation alluded to in these papers.   
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Equally, although the ambition of this paper was to explore compensation behaviours 
on a sectoral basis, there are very little data on non-commercial livestock keepers. This is 
despite acknowledgement within these literatures that they are likely to behave differently to 
commercial farmers and may be important in combating diseases. Although various papers 
suggest differences between farmers, this study found only two authors looking explicitly at 
commercial vs. hobby farmers.  These were again essentially modelling rather than empirical 
exercises (albeit with plausible policy implications).  
Hence, although many other influences on biosecurity and disease reporting have 
been identified, their interaction with financial incentive effects has not been explored. 
Consequently, echoing research on agri-environmental issues, there is scope for investigating 
the extent to which the performance of different compensation arrangements might be 
sensitive to other behavioural influences.   
 
4.1 A future research agenda 
Interventions in relation to prevention and control of exotic contagious diseases should aim at 
inducing long-term positive biosecurity behaviours between animal keepers. The Nuffield 
Ladder of Interventions concept provides a framework to analyse interventions and design 
optimal policies. This could include restricting or removing choices by further regulation at 
both peacetime and during disease outbreaks, encouraging and providing choices (i.e. 
nudging) by means of voluntary and economic policy instruments (such as compensation, 
reward or penalty) or a mixture of these options. Given the heterogeneity within animal 
keepers in terms of their values, goals, risk attitudes, size of operation, animal species and 
production chain characteristics, it is reasonable to suggest that a mixture of regulatory, fiscal 
and nudging policies will be required to achieve socially optimal results with respect to 
positive behaviour change to prevent and control exotic animal diseases. This was 
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highlighted by the results reviewed literature that specifically revealed a lack of available 
evidence about the effects of compensation payments for exotic animal disease on positive 
reporting behaviours or biosecurity measures employed. Hence, there is considerable scope 
for further investigating the extent to which the performance of different fiscal and non-fiscal 
arrangements might be sensitive to behavioural influences. What follows is a list of 
recommended topics and possible novel approaches which can address the significant gaps 
which emerge from this study and also be explored within applied work around this topic.  
 
Accuracy of economic characterisation 
The economics literature offers general guiding principles for setting compensation rates and 
conditionality requirements to encourage both investment in preventative biosecurity 
measures and timely reporting of disease incidence, with some allowance for variation to 
reflect disease and production characteristics (e.g. speed of infection spread, length of 
production cycle, etc.).  At its most basic, livestock keepers should be asked whether they 
recognise this characterisation of their behaviour as self-interested, rather than contributing to 
a wider social good (e.g. amongst neighbours or the wider public).    
 
Perverse incentives 
As an extension of above, the economic characterisation of behaviour in narrow self-interest 
terms also suggests scope for perverse incentives. For example, if diseased farms are 
compensated for culled animals and (since the animals are gone) avoid holding costs imposed 
during movement restrictions. Non-diseased farms facing holding costs but not receiving 
compensation have an incentive to seek infection. Again, livestock keepers should be asked 
whether they agree with this possibility. 
 
27 
 
Perceived costs and effective compensation rates 
The economics literature assumes that compensation relates to the value of culled animals, 
and possibly disinfection and restocking. If 100% of these costs are covered by taxpayers, 
farmers are presumed to have no incentive to invest in disease prevention.  However, farmers 
may well perceive additional costs beyond these. For example, business disruption and loss 
of supply contracts plus emotional distress if losing flocks/herds established by successive 
generations on a family farm. As such, headline rates would over-estimate effective 
compensation rates and farmers may well actually have incentives to avoid diseases even if 
culled animals are fully covered. Hence it is worth asking livestock keepers directly about 
their perceived costs and incentives for avoiding and, separately, reporting disease.  This 
would possibly also help to tease-out differences between different types of livestock keeper, 
e.g. commercial vs. hobby.    
The economics literature also rather assumes that the value of livestock can be easily 
determined to allow calculation of full or partial compensation. However, there are different 
approaches to valuation, for example net present value versus cost of replacement and 
farmers’ preferences may vary by a range of factors, such as sector and size.   
 
Source of compensation 
The economics literature focuses on how incentive structures can be adjusted by altering 
compensation rates and eligibility criteria to place some risk onto livestock keepers. The 
source (e.g. taxpayer or insurance fund) of compensation payments is not considered to 
influence incentives per se, although there is some consideration of farmers’ preferences to 
join voluntary insurance schemes and for post rather than pre-outbreak levies. Nevertheless, 
it is worth exploring with livestock keepers whether their reaction to different compensation 
rates would depend on how payments were funded. 
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Disease management in wider production/business context 
The economics literature acknowledges that biosecurity measures are but one of many 
production decisions taken by farmers. This has two implications. Firstly, disease risk may 
actually be managed in other ways, including reducing or even ceasing production (e.g. 
smaller herds, exiting the sector). Hence it is important to ask about perceived substitutability 
(and complementarities) between different control measures. Secondly, that non-adoption of 
biosecurity practices may reflect considered prioritisation of other risks and management 
actions. For example, for some farmers, addressing the risk of losing CAP Pillar I payments 
from cross-compliance breaches may have a higher priority than biosecurity measures. Hence 
it may be helpful to ask livestock keepers about how they perceive (or even rank) disease 
risks relative to other business risks and the extent to which changing compensation rates 
would affect this. 
 
Multiple disease risks and spillover effects 
The economics literature acknowledges that biosecurity measures imposed in relation to one 
disease can also convey benefits in relation to other diseases (referred to as spillover effects).   
It is beneficial to explore awareness of on-farm spillover effects, and whether they influence 
farmers’ decisions to adopt particular biosecurity measures. This could be extended to 
consider inter-farm spillovers, and potential gains from transparent reporting of practices 
amongst neighbours. This extends the more behavioural approaches outlined above in terms 
of the social identifications between farmers and the cultural capital of farming, effectively 
applying the idea of how a ‘good’ farmer is perceived by other farmers (Burton, 2004). This 
may help to explore more cost-effective interventions by means of local governance structure 
(Barnes et al, 2013). 
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Trust – risk communication, prevention measures and outbreak  
The economics literature assumes that farmers are aware of disease risks, understand 
prevention measures and will comply with outbreak controls. At the national level, member 
countries of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) are obliged to report outbreaks 
of the OIE-listed diseases (World Organisation for Animal Health, 2015b), provide facts and 
documents about the spread of diseases as well as information on the control measures and 
notifications to the national governments and veterinary authorities (World Organisation for 
Animal Health, 2015a). All of these require a degree of trust in sources of information/advice 
and the actions of others. Yet the non-economics literature highlights how such trust is often 
absent. For example, biosecurity measures can be viewed as ineffective due to poor design 
and/or poor implementation by neighbouring farmers and/or distrust in government to 
implement regional or national controls effectively. Therefore it is important to explore the 
extent to which responses to compensation are contingent on awareness and trust, or whether 
indeed shifting costs and responsibilities onto farmers overrides such influences, in effect if it 
is at some level of risk-bearing then behaviour will change.  
Exploring how disease is perceived may provide a useful basis for creating 
understanding between the different stakeholders involved. Recognition of the barriers and 
constraints experienced by different stakeholders may lead to elements of a ‘common view’ 
or at least identify the disparities between stakeholders and their disease control strategies.  
This should provide a deeper understanding of how to address these barriers, whether they 
are behavioural, institutional or social, towards prompt disease reporting.  
 
Flexibility vs. standardisation 
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The existence of heterogeneity across farms is highlighted by both the non-economic and the 
economic literature, with the implication being that a degree of flexibility and locally-
determined solutions would be better than standardisation of practices across all farm 
types/sizes/locations and diseases.  However, varying compensation arrangements according 
to, for example local circumstances and the nature of a disease will inevitably lead to 
different treatment for different farmers. The perceived fairness of this must be explored with 
livestock keepers, to gauge understanding and acceptance of the rationale for variation.   
 
5 Conclusion 
Responsibility and cost sharing agendas are emerging within Western Governments. Much 
like other sectors, the aim is to shift more of the burden from taxpayers to the livestock 
sector. A range of intervention measures have been applied but which invariably centre on 
fiscal mechanisms to encourage early reporting of suspicious disease. Hence, there are 
cultural and historical barriers against shifting to a mechanism which offers less fiscal 
incentives but yet promotes greater positive disease risk management practices by animal 
keepers. Ultimately, there is a paucity of evidence finding a causal link or indeed, few 
directly applicable investigations between compensation and behavioural change in the field 
of exotic animal health reporting that can be used to fully confirm the effect of these 
interventions.  Nevertheless, given certain assumptions regarding the economic behaviour of 
livestock keepers, full compensation leads to lax preventative behaviour, so partial 
compensation may induce better biosecurity. Accordingly compensation needs to be 
conditional to encourage disease reporting but such relationships are affected by a range of 
other confounding factors including the availability of and trust in advice. This may be of 
encouragement to Western Governments seeking to shift cost burdens as the propensity of 
non-economic studies tend to identify both a heterogeneity in response by animal keepers in 
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terms of their values, goals, risk attitudes, size of operation, animal species and production 
chain characteristics. This may indicate that the current compensation approach could be 
reduced and augmented with non-fiscal interventions, for example targeting along the supply 
chain or through ‘piggy-back’ approaches on current cooperative initiatives such as 
catchment level management schemes and carbon foot-printing initiatives. Nevertheless, the 
Nuffield Ladder of Interventions framework suggests a range of regulatory, fiscal and 
nudging policies are required to achieve socially optimal results with respect to positive 
behaviour change to prevent and control exotic animal diseases. However, the lack of directly 
available evidence which proves theses causal links may hinder progress towards this optimal 
mixture of choice and non-choice based interventions.   
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Figure Captions 
 
Fig. 1. The Nuffield Health Ladder of Interventions approach showing examples for 
encouraging positive disease reporting. 
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Tables 
Table 1. The seven research questions for the literature review presented in this paper.  
No. Research questions (RQ) 
1 What are the factors affecting speed of reporting suspicious exotic disease cases?   
2 What is the relationship between exotic disease compensation and implementation of 
biosecurity measures in “peacetime” and in an “outbreak”? 
3 Most influencing factors affecting behaviour at RQ1 and RQ2?   
4 Bonus or Penalty is likely to be more effective at RQ1 and RQ2?   
5 Possible effect of source of fund on behaviours with respect to biosecurity measures? 
6 Evidence of role of policy in creating perverse incentives?    
7 Evidence of significant impact of different compensation arrangements on disease reporting? 
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Table 2. PICO components of the review questions. 
Population Intervention Comparator Outcome 
(Behaviour of) 
Keepers of livestock 
susceptible to 
specified diseases. 
 
During “peacetime” 
and “outbreaks.  
Compensation for 
culled livestock, paid: 
In full (public) 
In part (public-private 
cost-sharing) 
Via insurance 
Before and after 
policy change within 
county 
 
Cross-country policy 
comparison 
 
Different farm 
contexts (e.g. norms, 
networks, attitudes) 
(Change in) ex ante 
biosecurity 
behaviours 
 
(Change in) ex post 
disease reporting 
 
(Change in) total 
disease cost and 
incidence 
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Table 3. Elements of the search strings. 
String 1 String 2 String 3 String 4 
Livestock disease 
 
Livestock Disease 
cull* 
 
Disease *  
 
Farm*  
 
Equine 
 
 FMD, AI, Swine 
Fever, Aujeszky’s  
Compensat*  
 
Cost*shar* 
 
[Co*finance*] 
 
Levy 
 
Insurance 
 
Incentive  
 
Governance 
 
Penalty  
Attitud* 
 
Motiv* 
 
Perce* 
 
Advice 
 
Trust 
 
Network  
 
Community  
 
Social 
Compliance 
 
Report* 
 
Biosecurity 
 
Cull* 
 
Risk Management  
 
Behave*  
(* as a wildcard for different word endings).  The search strings were combined using the 
Boolean OR operator and the Boolean AND operator. 
